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THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO REMOVE MEM-
BERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
RALSTONE R. IRVINE
The division of power between the three branches of the Federal
Government makes it uncertain how far Congress can legislate to
create an administrative body which is independent of the President.
If the executive power of the President carries with it the unrestrictable
right to remove any officer of the United States the independence of
the administrative expert is a mere illusion.
"Indeed, it is utterly impossible not to feel, that, if this un-
limited power of removal does exist, it may be made, in the hands
of a bold and designing man, of high ambition and feeble prin-
ciples, an instrument of the worst oppression, and most vindictive
vengeance ... It would convert all the officers of the country into
the mere tools and creatures of the president. A dependence so
servile on one individual, would deter men of high and honorable
minds from engaging in the public service. . .
In 1926 the Supreme Court of the United States decided in the
Myers case2 that the Congress could not restrict the power of the
President to remove a postmaster of the first class. In 1935 the Court
held in the Humphrey case3 that the President had acted without
authority in arbitrarily removing from office a member of the Federal
Trade Commission.
In the earlier case, the Court sustained the unrestrictable power of
the President to remove "purely executive" officers, for a postmaster
"is merely one of the units in the executive department and, hence,
inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal
by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aide he is." 4 In the
12 STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION (3rd ed. 1858) p. 401. In Humphrey's Execu-
tor v. United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 874, 79 L. ed. 908, 914
(1935) (also known as the Rathbun case), the Supreme Court observed that "it is
quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another
cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the
latter's will."
2Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52,47 Sup. Ct. 21, 7 L. ed. I6o (1926).
3Humphrey v. United States, supra note I.
4 d. at 627.
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Humphrey case, however, the Court upheld the power of Congress to
impose reasonable restrictions and limitations upon the power of the
President to remove officers of the United States whose functions are
exclusively quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.
Most officers, however, are not so readily susceptible of exact classi-
fication as "purely executive" or as exclusively quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial. The great majority of administrative bodies, commis-
sions and experts perform executive as well as quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial functions.5 The general power of the Congress to assure
the independence of such administrative bodies therefore has not been
determined specifically by the decisions in the Myers and the Humph-
rey cases.
The purpose of this article is to present a brief resum6 of the present
status of the law relative to the removal power of the President and to
indicate the application of established legal principles to the various
federal administrative agencies.
I. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Constitutional Provisions. The Constitution does not specifically
empower the President to remove officers of the United States. It does,
however, vest all executive power in the President and this includes
the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The
power to remove "purely executive officers" of the United States may
be based on this general grant of power.7
The Constitution also provides that the President "shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint"
certain officers of the United States." In spite of this language it has
been determined that in the case of officers appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Senate exercises
no portion of the appointing power.9 As a matter of statutory construc-
tion the power to remove flows from the power to appoint. Accordingly
it is said that when not otherwise limited by statute the President
5See infra Part II, p. 234, et seg.
6Art. II, § I, cl. I, and § 3.
7Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 117 (1926).
sThe President derives his power of appointment from the CONSTITUTION, Art.
II, § 2, cl. 2, which provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Ap-
pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
9Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 122, 125 (1926).
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having the sole power of appointment has the exclusive power of
removal.' 0
It thus appears that the President has a dual power of removal:
(i) In the exercise of his executive power he may remove executive
officers; (2) Unless restricted by the Constitution or by statute he may
remove any officer whom he has appointed, whether or not they\ are
executive officers.
The extent of the removal power of the President must be read in
the light of the powers of Congress. The Constitution vests all legisla-
tive power in the Congress which is expressly empowered "to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."'"
On its face this express delegation to Congress of all legislative
power suggests that Congress can dictate the nature and tenure of aty
office which it creates. The Congress obviously has the power under
the Constitution to create an administrative office. If the functions of
that office require the exercise of independent action, then Congress
has the express power to pass all "necessary and proper" laws to safe-
guard that independence even from the President. In so far as Congress
places reasonable restrictions on the President's power to remove
administrative experts whose fun*ctions are not purely executive, there
is no conflict with the executive power.
12
B. Construction of the Constitution by the First Congress. The First
Congress of the United States considered the question of the removal
power of the President under the Constitution.' 3 Its views are of pecu-
liar significance since many of its leaders had been members of the
Constitutional Convention.
The question concerning the removal power arose under the follow-
ing circumstances. A bill to create an executive department, to be
known as the Department of Foreign Affairs, was introduced in the
House by James Madison. The bill in its original form provided that
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was "to be removable from office by
the President." Some members of Congress objected that this clause
lOEx parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (U. S. x839); Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S.
324 (1897); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 119, 122, 126, 161 (1926).
"Art. I, § i, and § 8, cl. 18.
12Humphrey v. United States, 295 U. S. 602,632, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 874, 79 L. ed.
9o8, 916 (,935).
13Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 1O9, 136 (1926). For an excellent analy-
sis of the views of the members of the First Congress on the removal power see
CORWIN ON THE PRESMENT's R movAL POWER (1927) pp. 10-23.
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implied an attempt by the legislature to confer upon the President a
constitutional power which he already possessed. Others contended
he had no such power. An amendment was thereupon offered to change
this language to read "whenever the' said principal officer shall be
removed from office by the President of the United States. ' 14 The bill
as amended was passed by both houses of Congress.' 5
It has been urged that this action by the First Congress (known as
the Decision of 1789) and the debates which led to it, expressed the
sense of Congress that with respect to all officers of the United States
except judges the Constitution gave to the President a power of re-
moval which could not be restricted by the legislature. 16
An examination of the debates shows, however, that the views of
many of the leaders of Congress were influenced by the fact that the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs was to be a political officer, who would be
truly an agent of the President, and whose functions were to be purely
141 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (1834) col. 578.
IsSee CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 12-13. There is no complete record of
the proceedings in the Senate. The vote on the passage of the bill was a tie, the
deciding vote was cast by the Vice President, John Adams. Senator Edmonds
made the following analysis of the proceedings in the House of Representatives
(III IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON (x868) pp. 84, 85):
"Of the 54 Members of the House of Representatives present, those who
argued that the power of removal was, by the Constitution, in the President,
were Sedgewick, Madison (who had maintained the opposite), Vining,
Boudinot, Clymer, Benson, Scott, Goodhue, and Baldwin. Those who con-
tended that the President had not the power, but that it might be conferred
by law, but ought not to be, were Jackson, Stone, and Tucker.
"Those who believe that the President had not the power, and that it
could not be conferred, were White, Smith of South Carolina, Livermore, and
Page.
"Those who maintained that the President had not the inherent power, but
that it might be bestowed by law, and that it was expedient to bestow it, were
Huntington, Madison at first, Gerry, Ames, Hartly, Lawrence, Sherman,
Lee and Sylvester-24 in all, speaking. Of these, 15 thought the Constitution
did not confer this power upon the President, while only 9 thought other-
wise. But those who thought he had the power and those who thought the
law ought to confer it were 17.
"Thirty did not speak at all, and in voting upon the words conferring or
recognizing the power, they were just as likely to vote upon the grounds of
Roger Sherman as upon the reasons of those who merely intended to admit
the power. On the motion to strike out the words 'to be removable by the
President,' the ayes were 2o, and the noes 34; but no guess, even, can be
formed that this majority took one view rather than the other. Indeed, adding
only the 8 who spoke against the inherent power, but for the provisions of law,
to the 20 opponents of both, and there is a clear majority adverse to any
such inherent power in the President. And when on the next day it was pro-
posed to change the language to that which became the law, among the ayes
are the names of White, Smith of South Carolina, Livermore, Page, Hunt-
ington, Gerry, Ames and Sherman, all of whom, as we have seen, were of
opinion against the claim of an inherent power of removal in the President."
16See 2 STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION (3rd ed. 1858) 400; Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52, 114 (1926).
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executive.17 In view of the emphasis thus placed upon the nature of the
office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs it is clear that the First Con-
gress did not purport to determine that the President had an arbitrary
power to remove any administrative officer regardless of his function.
One week after the Decision of 1789 the nature and extent of the
removal power was again before the First Congress. In connection
with a bill to organize the Treasury Department, the question arose 8
as to the tenure of office of the comptroller whose chief function was
to pass on claims and accounts between the United States and its citi-
zens. In contrasting this new office with that of Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Madison observed that the office of comptroller partook
of the judicial quality as well as the executive. It was his view that the
President's power to remove such an officer might be limited by Con-
gress.1
9
1 7See statements of: Sedgewick, I ANNALS OF CONGRESS (1834) col. 522;
Boudinot, I Id. col. 528; Benson, i Id. cal. 5o5; Vining, I Id. cols. 465, 511, 512;
Hartly, i Id. cols. 479-480; Lawrence, I Id. col. 485.
"
8For a discussion of this second debate on the question of the President's
power of removal see, Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under The
Constitution (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 352, 366.
;"Mr. Madison had voted in favor of the "Decision of 1789," but in discussing
the Comptroller of the Treasury he declared:
"It will be necessary to consider the nature of this office, to enable us to
come to a right decision on the subject; in analyzing its properties, we shall
easily discover they are not purely of an Executive nature. It seems to me
that they partake of a Judiciary quality as well as Executive; perhaps the
latter obtains in the greatest degree. The principal duty seems to be deciding
upon the lawfulness and justice of the claims and accounts subsisting between
the United States and particular citizens: This partakes strongly of the judi-
cial character, and there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind
should not hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the
Government. I am inclined to think that we ought to consider him some-
thing in the light of an arbitrator between the public and individuals, and that
he ought to hold his office by such a tenure as will make him responsible to
the public generally; then again it may be thought, on the other side, that
some persons ought to be authorized on behalf of the individual, with the
usual liberty of referring to a third person, in case of disagreement, which
may throw some embarrassment in the way of the first idea.
"Whatever, Mr. Chairman, may be my opinion with respect to the tenure
by which an Executive Officer may hold his office according to the meaning
of the Constitution, I am very well satisfied, that a modification by the
Legislature may take place in such as partake of the judicial qualities, and
that the legislative power is sufficient to establish this office on such a footing
as to answer the purposes for which it is prescribed." I ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS (1834) col. 611-612.
Mr. Sedgwick disagreed with Mr. Madison as to the nature of the office of
Comptroller. He said:
"He also conceived that a majority of the House had decided that all
officers concerned in Executive business should depend upon the will of the
President for their continuance in office; and with good reason, for they were
the eyes and arms of the principal Magistrate, the instruments of execution."
i Id., col. 613.
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".... Whatever, Mr. Chairman, may be my opinion with respect
to the tenure by which an Executive officer may hold his office
according to the meaning of the Constitution, I am very well
satisfied, that a modification by the Legislature may take place in
such as partake of the judicial qualities, and that the legislative
power is sufficient to establish this office on such a footing as to
answer the purposes for which it is prescribed.'
u9 a
The distinction which Mr. Madison makes is significant. It is a dis-
tinction between a purely executive officer and an administrative officer
performing quasi-judicial functions in an executive department of the
Government. Madison believed that the Congress had no power to
limit or restrict the power of the President to remove purely executive
officers, whereas the executive's power of removal might be limited
in order to protect the independent character of an office having quasi-
judicial as well as executive functions, and even though that office is
part of the executive department.
C. Decisions of the Supreme Court. In only two cases has the Su-
preme Court squarely passed upon the power of Congress to limit or
restrict the removal power of the President. The first of these cases
is Myers v. United States.20 In that case Myers had been appointed a
postmaster of the first class for a term of four years, pursuant to an
Act of Congress which provided for his removal by the President "by
Mr. Madison in reply said:
"When I was up before... I endeavored to show that the nature of
this office differed from the others upon which the House had decided; and,
consequently, that a modification might take place, without interfering with
the former distinction; so that it cannot be said we depart from the spirit of
the Constitution.
"Several arguments were adduced to show the Executive Magistrate had
constitutionally a right to remove subordinate officers at pleasure. Among
others it was urged, with some force, that these officers were merely to assist
him in the performance of duties, which, from the nature of man, he could
not execute without them, although he had an unquestionable right to do
them if he were able; but I question very much whether he can or ought to
have any interference in the settling and adjusting the legal clains of individ-
uals against the United States. The necessary examination and decision in
such cases partake too much of the Judicial capacity to be blended with the
Executive. I do not say the office is either Executive or Judicial; I think it
rather distinct from both, though it partakes of each, and therefore some
modification, accommodated to those circumstances, ought to take place."
z Id. col. 614.
The Congress concluded that the Comptroller was an executive officer and it
was perhaps for that reason that the suggestion of Mr. Madison was not carried
out.
i 1 Id., col. 611-612.
20272 U. S. 52,47 Sup. Ct. 21, 71 L. ed. f6o (1926). The opinion of the Court was
written by Chief Justice Taft. Justices Holmes, McReynolds and Brandeis each




and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ' 21 The President
through his Postmaster General removed Myers from office before
the expiration of his term without the advice and consent of the Senate.
Later Myers brought suit in the Court of Claims for the salary accru-
ing to his former office for the period between the time of his removal
and the expiration of his term. The Court of Claims rendered judgment
against Myers on the ground of laches. On appeal to the Supreme
Court the judgment was affirmed on the ground that the removal had
been properly made.
22
The precise holding of the Court23 was that the act of removal was
an executive act and that Congress could not appropriate to the Senate
an executive power by requiring the assent of the Senate to the removal
of executive officers. But the opinion of the Court was not confined to
this narrow issue. In unmistakable language Chief Justice Taft, who
had once been President himself, expressed the view that the Presi-
dent's power to remove an administrative officer of the Government
could not be limited or restricted by Congress. The following quotation
from the opinion makes clear that, contrary to the view expressed
by Madison, 24 the Chief Justice believed that the President's illimitable
21Act of July 12, 1876, c. 179 § 6, ig STAT. 8o, 81.
22The government conceded at the argument that the Court of Claims decision
on the question of laches was erroneous. The Court found no valid distinction
could be made between "superior" and inferior officers. "There is nothing in the
Constitution which permits a distinction between the removal of the head of a
department or a bureau, when he discharges a political duty of the President or
exercises his discretion, and the removal of executive officers engaged in the dis-
charge of their other normal duties." 272 U. S. 134, and see 158-161.
23The Court summarized its views at pages 163 and 164 as follows:
"Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the arguments before stated,
is that Article II grants to the President the executive power of the Govern-
ment, i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws,
including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers-a
conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed; that Article Il excludes the exercise of legislative power by
Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted
therein to Congress in the matter of inferior officers; that Congress is only
given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers
after it has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in
other authority than the President with the Senate's consent; that the
provisions of the second section of Article II, which blend action by the legis-
lative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive, are limitations
to be strictly construed and not to be extended by implication; that the
President's power of removal is further established as an incident to' his
specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice of
the Senate, but that such incident does not by implication extend to removals
the Senate's power of checking appointments; and finally that to hold other-
wise would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other
differences with the Senate or Congress to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed."24See supra note 19.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
power of removal extended to administrative officers performing quasi-
judicial as well as executive functions. The opinion declares that:
"Then there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed
on executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose
decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the dis-
charge of which the President can not in a particular case properly
influence or control. But even in such a case he may consider the
decision after its rendition as a reason for removing the officer,
on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that office
by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exer-
cised. Otherwise he does not discharge his own constitutional duty
of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed." 25
In view of the recent opinion of the Court in Humphrey's Executor
v. United States,26 it may well be doubted whether this dictum correctly
expresses the law. In the Humphrey case it appeared: that William E.
Humphrey had been appointed a Federal Trade Commissioner pur-
suant to Section i of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which pro-
vided in part that "any commissioner may be removed by the President
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." On October
7, 1933, President Roosevelt removed Humphrey from office without
assigning any cause for removal and without affording him an oppor-
tunity to be heard. After the death of Humphrey his executor brought
suit in the Court of Claims to recover Humphrey's salary as a Federal
Trade Commissioner from the time of his removal from office until
his death. The Court of Claims certified two questions to the Supreme
Court:
"i. Do the provisions of section i of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, stating that 'any commissioner may be removed by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office'
restrict or limit the power of 'the President to remove a commis-
sioner except upon one or more of the causes named?
"If the foregoing question is answered in the affirmative, then-
"2. If the power of the President to remove a commissioner is
restricted or limited as shown by the foregoing interrogatory and
the answer made thereto, is such a restriction or limitation valid
under the Constitution of the United States ?"
The Supreme Court answered each question in the affirmative.
2 7
2 2 7 2 U. S. 52, 135.
2295 U. S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. ed. 9o8, decided May 27, 1935. The opin-
ion is written by Mr. Justice Sutherland. Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred in
the decision and declared that his views are stated in his dissenting opinion in the
Myers case, 272 U. S. 178.
21The Government urged that the case of Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S.
311 (19O3), was decisive of the first question. In that case the President had re-
moved Shurtleff, a general appraiser of merchandise, without assigning any cause
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In response to the second question the Court held that the power of
the President to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner had been
constitutionally restricted by Congress, and that consequently a Federal
Trade Commissioner could be removed only after notice and hearing
for the causes stated in the statute.
The Myers case was distinguished upon the ground that a postmaster
is a "purely executive officer" who is properly subject to the domina-
tion of the President, whereas a Federal Trade Commissioner performs
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions and is in no sense an
executive officer. The fundamental doctrine of a division of power
between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Govern-
ment was held to be inconsistent with an unrestrictable executive power
of removal over officers performing exclusively quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial functions. The Court pointed out that the power to re-
move is the power to dominate. It held that the President had no power
under the Constitution to dominate and control officers performing
functions which were not executive in nature. In concluding its opinion,
the Court stated:
"The result of what we now have said is this: Whether the
power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the
authority of Congress to condition the powyer by fixing a definite
term and precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon
the character of the office; the Myers decision, affirming the power
of the President alone to make the removal, is confined to purely
executive officers; and as to officers of the kind here under con-
sideration, we hold that no removal can be made during the pre-
for his action. Shurtleff held office under a statute, which, like the Federal Trade
Commission Act, provided that the President might remove for "inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The statute, however, did not specify
the tenure of the office. The Court sustained the power of the President to re-
move Shurtleff without notice or hearing and without cause named on the ground
the statute did not exclude removal for any other cause. In the Humphrey
case, however, the Supreme Court distinguished the Shurtleff case on the ground
that under the Federal Trade Commission Act the tenure of office was for a
definite term of years, whereas, in the Act involved in the Shurtleff case no term
of office was specified by statute. As a result an appraiser of merchandise would
hold office under this statute for life, except for removal by impeachment. The
Supreme Court in the Shurtleff case declared that it was inconceivable that
Congress intended such a result. For that reason it refused to apply the normal
rule of construction expressed in the maxim expressio unius est excdusio alterius to
the exceptional circumstances in that case.
In the Humphrey case the Court also pointed out that Congress intended the
Federal Trade Commission to be an impartial body composed of trained experts
and performing predominantly quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties inde-
pendent of the executive authority except in its selection of members. 295 U. S.
624, 625, 55 Sup. Ct. 872, 873, 79 L. ed. 912.
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scribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or
more of the causes named in the applicable statute.
"To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers case,
which sustains the unrestrictable power of the President to remove
purely executive officers, and our present decision that such power
does not extend to an office such as that here involved, there shall
remain a field of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within
it for future consideration and determination as they may arise.1
28
The Court thus avoids any specific discussion of the question of the
power of the President to remove an officer performing quasi-judicial
or quasi-legislative as well as substantial executive duties. Since the
great majority of our administrative boards have both executive and
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions it is to be regretted that the
question of their independence from executive control has not been
determined. The opinion of the Court is of some aid, however, in
predicting what the decision will be when a case presenting this issue
arises.
29
The Myers case has been confined to "purely executive officers." In
using this phrase the Court in the Humphrey case has apparently
adverted to the distinction drawn by James Madison between a "purely
executive officer" (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) and an officer in an
executive department performing quasi-judicial as well as executive
duties (Comptroller of the Treasury).30 The distinction suggested by
Madison seems sound if the doctrine of a division of power between
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government is to
be adhered to. That the President has the power to remove and thereby
dominate and control political executive officers and officers who in
effect act as his executive agents seems beyond question. But when the
Congress clothes an office with quasi-judicial as well as executive func-
tions there is not the same need for unlimited executive control. The
proper exercise of a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative duty is dependent
upon the officer's freedom from interference and immunity from
arbitrary removal. And even though such an officer also may have
executive functions it would seem "reasonable and proper" for Con-
gress to protect his independence of action by imposing reasonable
limitations upon the President's power to remove.
1
28295 U. S. 6o2, 631-632, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 875, 79 L. ed. 908, 916.
29See infra Part II, page 229, for a discussion of application of the principles of
the removal power to various administrative commissions, courts and boards.
3OSupra note. 1g. In this connection the Court observed that "Mr. Madison
quite evidently thought that, since the duties of the office (Comptroller) were not
purely of an executive nature but partook of the judiciary quality as well, a dif-
ferent rule in respect of executive removal might apply." Humphrey v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602, 631, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 875, 79 L. ed. 9o8, 9,5 (1935).
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Any analysis of the President's power to remove administrative
officers requires an examination of several other Supreme Court de-
cisions and the re-appraisal of them in the light of the Humphrey
opinion.
The first of these cases is Marbury v. Madison.31 President Adams,
with the advice of the Senate, had appointed Marbury a justice of the
peace of the District of Columbia for a statutory term of five years.
32
Marbury's commission was signed by John Adams near the end of his
term as President, and it was sealed by his Secretary of State, John
Marshall. Before the commission was delivered to Marbury, Jefferson
became President. He promptly ordered his Secretary of State, James
Madison, not to deliver the commission. Thereupon Marbury moved
the Supreme Court of the United States for a rule on the Secretary of
State to show cause why mandamus should not issue requiring Madison
to deliver the commission.
President Jefferson had made no attempt to remove Marbury from
office. It was conceded at the bar, however, that if the President or his
subordinates had the power to remove Marbury from office at will
the refusal to deliver the commission was tantamount to a removal from
office and in that event no case or controversy would be presented for
decision. The question of the President's power of removal, therefore,
arose only in connection with the issue thus made between counsel as
to whether Marbury had such a right to his office as entitled him to
mandamus to compel delivery of the commission. In determining this.
question Chief Justice Marshall said:
"Where an officer is removeable at the will of the executive,
the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no con-
cern; because the act is at any time revocable; and the commission
may be arrested, if still in the office. But when the officer is not
removeable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not
revocable, and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights
which cannot be resumed.
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised, until the
appointment has been made. But having once made the appoint-
ment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases where, by
law, the officer is not removeable by him. The right to the office
is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute uncondi-
tional power of accepting or rejecting it.
"Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the
President, and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed;
311 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
nThe conclusion reached by the Chief Justice, namely that the specification of a
definite term of office restricted the power of the President to remove a Justice of
the Peace, has not been followed in subsequent cases involving officers having
other functions. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897), infra note 35.
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and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold
for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was
not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are pro-
tected by the laws of his country."3
In the Myers case, Chief Justice Taft declared that this statement of
Marshall was obiter dictum,3 4 adding that "If his language was more
than a dictum, and was a decision, then the Parsons case3 5 overrules
it." In the Humphrey case, Justice Sutherland is content to point out
that the opinion in Marbury z. Madison presents the view of Marshall
that the President's power to remove a justice of the peace may be
restricted since there is a clear distinction between such an officer and
one whose acts are the acts of the President.36 The emphasis which the
Court has most recently placed upon the nature of the office in deter-
mining the President's power of removal suggests that Chief Justice
Marshall's decision is to be reconciled with the Myers case upon the
ground that Marbury v. Madison involved an officer performing
judicial functions, whereas the Myers case involved a postmaster who
was clearly an executive officer.
37
3I Cranch 162.
34272 U. S. 52, 141-143 (1926). The argument to the effect that the statement of
Chief Justice Marshall was germane to the decision in Marbury v. Madison is
forcefully stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Myers v.
United States, at 2157218.
nParsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897), arose under Rav. STAT. § 769
(1873), which provides that district attorneys shall be appointed for a term of four
years. Parsons was appointed a district attorney with the consent of the Senate.
The President removed him before his term had expired and nominated a suc-
cessor, who was confirmed by the'Senate before the expiration of the term of Par-
sons. After four years from the date of his commission Parsons brought suit in
the Court of Claims for his salary to the end of his term of office. The Court of
Claims entered judgment for the United States. On appeal the judgment was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. It was pointed out that while the Tenure of
Office Act and the modifying Act of 1869 were in force all questions respecting the
validity of an executive removal would have been set at rest by the subsequent
action of the Senate in confirming the appointment of a successor before the
expiration of the term of the removed official. The Supreme Court concluded that
the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act and the Act of 1869 was inconsistent with
the contention of Parsons that after the repeal he had rights superior to those
which he would have had if the Acts had remained in force. The actual decision
therefore throws no light upon the question of the President's power of removal.
-"295 U. S. 602, 631, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 875, 79 L. ed. 908, 915.
37See Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419 (I9OI). The power of removal also
was discussed at length in Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (U. S. 1839). That case
involved the right of a United States District Court Judge to remove from office a
clerk of the District Court. This right was upheld on the ground that such officers
were removable at will by the one exercising the power of appointment. On the
question of the power of removal, Mr. Justice Thompson stated: "In the absence
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The later case of United States v. Perkins3 s suggests that the Presi-
dent's removal power may be limited by Congress by the simple ex-
pedient of vesting the appointment of an officer in the head of a depart-
ment or a court of law.39 That case arose under Section 1229 of the
Revised Statutes, which provided in effect that no officer in the naval
service could be removed in-time of peace except pursuant to sentence
of a court-martial. Perkins, a naval cadet engineer appointed by the
Secretary of the Navy, was removed by that official otherwise than pur-
suant to court-martial. The Court held that the removal was illegal.
The decision specifically holds that Congress may restrict or limit
the removal power of the head of a Department. However, the lan-
guage of the Court goes much further. For example, the Court quoted
with approval the following language from the opinion of the lower
court:
"We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the ap-
pointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may
limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the
public interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus
vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in rela-
tion to the officers so appointed.
'40
This language suggests that the limitations placed by Congress upon
the removal power of the head of a department are equally binding
upon the President. It is difficult to reconcile this suggestion with the
proposition stated in the Myers case that the power to remove an
executive officer is an executive power of the President. The executive
power is possessed by the President alone. If Congress may not directly
restrict the President's power to remove executive officers there seems
no reason to assume that Congress may encroach upon executive power
by indirection.
The true test of the power of Congress to limit the executive's power
would seem to depend not upon the source of the appointing power but
upon the nature of the office. In other words, the test is whether the
office which the Congress has created is "purely" an executive office,
or whether the nature and function of the office require that it be
of all constitutional provision or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound
and necessary rule to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of
appointment."
3sI6 U. S. 483 (1886).
39This view is restated by Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States, 272
U. S. 52, 173-174 (1926).
40116 U. S. 483,485, aff'g, 20 Ct. Cl. 438 (1885).
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reasonably secure from the domination of the President.
41
From the foregoing decisions the following seem to be established:
i. In the absence of constitutional or statutory limitation, the power
of removal is incident to the power of appointment.
42
2. The power to remove purely executive officers is an essential part
of the executive power.
43
3. Congress may not appropriate the President's power over execu-
tive officers by requiring the assent of the Senate to their removal.4"
4. Congress may impose reasonable limitations upon the power of
the President to remove officers who have quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial duties.
45
4iThe decision in the Humphrey case, supra note i, seems likewise to confine the
application of the rule of statutory construction adopted in Blake v. United
States, 103 U. S. 227 (188o), to purely executive offices and the armed forces of
the United States. That case involved a suit to recover the salary alleged to be due
Blake as Post Chaplain in the Army. It was urged on behalf of the United States
that Blake had been properly removed by the appointment, by and with the
consent of the Senate, of his successor. The Fifth Section of the Act of July 17,
1866,14 STAT. 92, provided that "no officer in the military or naval service shall, in
time of peace, be dismissed from the service, except upon and in pursuance of
the sentence of a court-martial to that effect." The Court -held that this statute
was only intended to restrict the power of removal when exercised by the Presi-
dent acting alone and was not intended to restrict the power of the President and
the Senate together to remove such officers. It was therefore held that the ap-
pointment and confirmation of a successor to Blake operated as a proper re-
moval. While the case was decided on a question of statutory construction, it
suggests the question whether any limitation may be placed upon the power of
the President and Senate to remove an officer by the appointment of a successor.
The Blake case has been followed by a number of precisely similar cases:
Keyes v. United Sttes, 109 U. S. 336 (1883); Mullan v. United States, 240 U. S.
240 (I89I); Wallace v. United States, 257 U. S. 541 (1922). See also Parsons v.
United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897).
In the Humphrey case the record disclosed that the successor to Humphrey
had been nominated and appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The Court did not comment on this fact. Since the case arose on a
certified question the fact of the appointment of a successor was not strictly in
issue before the Supreme Court. On principle, however, it would seem that where
Congress has lawfully restricted the President's removal power the intention of
Congress may not be defeated by the President acting with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The power to restrict is a power of Congress. It is not a power
inherent in the Senate. Consequently the Senate would seem to have no constitu-
tional power to defeat the intention of Congress to protect an officer from
arbitrary removal.
4 2Supra page 216 and note io.
4 Supra pages 217 and 220; Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
44Supra page 221, and Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
4.Supra page 223; Humphreyv. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79
L. ed. 9o8 (1935).
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5. As to officers who perform quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial func-
tions and who also perform executive duties, it is reasonable to con-
lude that Congress may place upon the President's power of removal
such limitations as are necessary and proper to make it possible for
such officers properly to discharge the independent functions of their
office.
4 6
6. A purely executive officer holding office for a specified term of
years may be removed at will by the President.4 7 This result has been
reached on the theory that Congress did not intend to restrict the Presi-
dent's power. This rule of construction as applied to" ejecutive officers
is to be distinguished from the rule adopted by Chief Jusiice Marshall
in the case of Marbury v. Madison. That case suggests that the Presi-
dent may not remove a judicial officer holding office for a definite term
of years.
48
7. If Congress vests the power of appointment in the'head of a de-
partment or a court of law it may restrict the power of such head of a
department or court of law to remove the officer so appointed.
4 9
8. The power of Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers
in the heads of departments or in courts of law would seem to give it no
peculiar added power to restrict or limit the removability of any execu-
tive officer by the President.50
9. Where, as in the Humphrey case, Congress may constitutionally
limit or restrict the removal power of the President, the nomination
and confirmation of a successor to the officer removed will not act as a
legal ouster.51
II. APPLICATION OF THE LAW
We come now to a consideration of those statutes which restrict or
limit the power of the President to remove the members of legislative
courts and administrative agencies. 52 In determining whether Congress
4'Supra page 224.
47Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897); Myers v. United States, 272
U. S. 52 (1926).
48Supra pages 225 and 226.
49United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483 (1886). -
5Supra page 227.
5Supra note 41.
82In the Humphrey case, supra note i, the Court specifically limited its opinion
to members of the Federal Trade Commission, and similar bodies, such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission and Court of Claims. It did not purport to
give a general opinion denying the power of the President to remove all members
of boards, commissions and administrative bodies. The opinion does, however,
suggest the principle of law which should control in determining the extent of the
power of Congress to restrict or'limit the President's power of removal.
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has exceeded its constitutional powers in enacting these restrictive
provisions, it is pertinent to apply the principles summarized above. In
each case there will be presented the same two questions which in the
Humphrey case were certified to the Supreme Court. These questions
are:
(i) Did Congress intend by the statute to limit or restrict the
removal power of the President?
(2) Is the restriction or limitation valid under the Constitution
of the United States ?
The first of these questions involves statutory interpretation ;53 the
second question involves constitutional construction.
A. Court of Claims and Customs Courts.5" The Court of Claims,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and the United States Cus-
toms Court are among the most important of the statutory or legislative
courts. Not being constitutional courts,55 they do not exercise the
judicial power conferred by Article III of the Constitution. The duties
and jurisdiction of these Courts are limited to hearing, reviewing and
determining certain specified types of legal controversies. 6 While
these functions were formerly5" entrusted by Congress to an executive
branch of the Government, they are now clearly judicial in character.
The judges of these three Courts are appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to "hold their offices
during good behavior."'5 8 This language as applied to a judicial office
indicates an intention by Congress to restrict the power of the Presi-
IsThe intent of Congress is to be derived from the language of the entire statute
and not merely those provisions which mention the causes of removal. The opinion
in the Humphrey case shows that the Court analyzed the various duties of the
Federal Trade Commission as provided in the Act. The Committee Reports of
Congress, its debates, the history and derivation of the particular body, and such
other matters are aids which should be investigated in each instance to determine
the intent of Congress and the exact meaning of the statute. Cf. Humphrey v.
United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, 624-625, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 872-873, 79 L. ed. 9o8,912
(1935).
rio STAT. 612 (i855), 28 U. S. C. A. c. 7 (1926) (Courtof Claims);36 STAT. 105
(1904), 28 U. S. C. A. c. 8 (1926) (Court of Customs and PatentAppeals); 46 STAT.
737, 19 U. S. C. A. § 1516-1518 (1930) (United States Customs Court).
55Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corpora-
tion, 279 U. S. 438 (1929). 58Supra note 54.
"Many of the duties now performed by the U. S. Customs Court (formerly
named the Board of General Appraisers) were originally performed by general
appraisers acting under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury. Cf. Shurt-
leff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311 (I903). Before the Act of February 25, 1855,
C. 522, creating the Court of Claims, the Treasury Department handled claims
against the United States.
58io STAT. 612 (1855), 28 U. S. C. A. § 241 (1926); 46 STAT. 762, 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 3oi (b) (1930); 46 STAT. 737, r9 U. S. C. A. § r518 (r930).
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dent to remove these judges. The acts creating and extending the
jurisdiction of these courts also show that Congress intended that their
duties should be judicial in nature.
The desire of Congress to place these courts outside the pale of
executive interference was fulfilled by the opinion in the Humphrey
case. In the Humphrey case the Solicitor General conceded that the
members of the Federal Trade Commission were in the same category
as Interstate Commerce Commissioners and judges of the Court of
Claims. In commenting on this concession, the Court stated:
"We think it plain under the Constitution that the illimitable
power of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of
offices of the character of those just named."'5 9
While the Humphrey case involved a member of the Federal Trade
Commission, the above quotation is persuasive dictum that the Court
specifically intended its decision to apply to "judges of the legislative
Court of Claims, exercising judicial power."60 As the duties of the
judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United
States Customs Court are strictly judicial in nature and as the statutes
pertaining to removal are identical with the statute relative to the
Court of Claims, it necessarily follows that the President's power to
remove judges of these latter two courts has been properly restricted
by Congress.
B. Territorial Courts.(' The District of Columbia, the territories and
possessions of the United States are under the immediate control of
Prior to the Myers case, supra note 2, the statute relating to the Board of
Appraisers (United States Customs Court) provided that the members "shall hold
their office during good behavior, but may, after due hearing, be removed by the
President for the following causes and no other: neglect of duty, malfeasance in
office, or inefficiency." 42 STAT. 972 (1922), i9 U. S. C. A. § 405 (1926). The sec-
tion was so worded in order to get around the decision of Shurtleff v. United
State, supra note 27. The Tariff Act of 1930, § 65i (a), repealed this section and
in § 518 (i9 U. S. C. A. § 1518) provided only that the members "shall hold their
office during good behavior." This is persuasive evidence of congressional intent to
assure, if it could be done in spite of the Myers and Shurtleff cases, that the judges
of the United States Customs Court would be outside the control or removal power
of the President.
r9295 U. S. 602, 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 874, 79 L. ed. 9o8, 914. 60Ibid.
O1See infra note 70 for names of such courts. While not strictly territorial courts,
for sake of brevity, the inferior courts of the District of Columbia are also here
discussed. The United States Courts of Appeals and the 'Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia are constitutional courts. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289
U. S. 516, 538 (1933). However, the inferior courts in the District, like territorial
courts, are subject to control of Congress under the power conferred on Congress
to regulate the District of Columbia. U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl. 12. The prin-
ciples of removal of judges of territorial courts apply to such inferior courts.
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Congress. This supervisory power arises from the constitutional pro-
vision vesting in Congress the power "to dispose of and make all need-
ful regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States. ' 62 It is by virtue of this power and "of the national
sovereignty" that Congress is empowered to create territorial courts.
Such courts are not invested with any of the judicial power mentioned
in Article Ill of the Constitution.63 They are legislative, not constitu-
tional, courts. Their functions, however, are clearly judicial in scope
and nature.
Territorial courts owe their creation and existence to Congress. The
tenure, pay and duties of the office of judge of a territorial court depend
upon Congress alone. With such power over the existence and nature
of territorial courts, it is reasonable to infer that Congress has the right
to place reasonable limitations upon the President's removal power of
judges of territorial courts.64
In the Myers case the Supreme Court seems to concede impliedly
that its opinion does not extend to a denial of the authority of Congress
to limit the power of the President to remove territorial judges.65 Any
doubts which the Court entertained in that case apparently have been
removed by the principle established in the Humphrey case,
Since territorial courts perform judicial rather than executive func-
tions the Humphrey case is decisive of the power of Congress to insure
their independence by the imposition of reasonable limitations upon
the President's removal power.66
H ow far Congress has exercised its power to limit the President's
right to remove territorial judges is a question of interpretation of the
statutes relating to each territorial court. All of the statutes provide
62U. S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.'
63American Insurance Co. v. Canter, i Pet. 51I (U. S. 1828); Clinton v. Engle-
brecht, i3 Wall. 434 (U. S. 1871); Hornbreclde v.-Toombs, I8 Wall. 648 (U. S.
1873); McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174 (I89i); Romeu v. Todd, 206
U. S. 358 (1907). See also discussion of such courts in EX parte Bakelite Corpora-
tion, supra note 55; O'Donoghue v. United States, supra note 61; Williams v.
United States, supra note 55.
61Cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Myers v. United States, 232
U. S. 52, 177 (1926). See also, Humphrey v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 629, 55
Sup. Ct. 869, 874, 79 L. ed. 9o8, 914 (1935), where the Court states that the
authority of Congress to create quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies inde-
pendent of executive control cannot well be doubted.
6272 U. S. 52, x55-I58.
66The Court of Claims is a legislative court exercising judicial functions. Wil-
liams v. United States, supra note 55. Territorial courts are also legislative
courts with judicial functions. As the Humphrey case is specifically applicable to
the Court of Claims, it is authority for the validity of Congressional restrictions
on the President's removal power of judges of territorial courts.
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that the President shall appoint the judges of the territorial courts.
In one instance the removal power is given to someone other than the
President.67 In two instances the statutes do not state where the re-
moval power lies.68 In conformity with the general principle of statu-
tory construction discussed above, the removal power in these instances
is vested in the appointing officer, subject to such reasonable restric-
tions as Congress prescribes. 69 As to most territorial courts the statutes
provide that the officer of the court can be removed by the President
"for cause."
70
67Municipal Court of the District of Columbia, D. C. CODE (1929) Tit. I8,
§ 191, provides: "a term of four years and until his successor is duly appointed and
qualified" for judges of the Municipal Court. § 41 provides that the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia, sitting in general term, "may hear charges of
misconduct against any judge of the Municipal Court and remove him from office
for cause shown." This statute is one of the few where Congress has placed the
removal power in someone other than the appointor. See also, Comptroller
General of United States, infra page 238. Such a statute is constitutional when
applied to an officer whose functions are exclusively judicial or legislative. Thus
the removal power of executive officers must be in the President but the removal
of judicial or quasi-judicial officers may be in the judiciary or in the legislative
branch or in any other body.
61Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, 39 STAT. 555 (1916), 48 U. S. C. A.
§ 1073 (1926) (no term of office or method of removal provided); District Court of
Hawaii, 31 STAT. 158 (19oo), 48 U. S. C. A. § 643 (1926) (hold office for six years
"unless sooner removed by the President"); District Court of the United States
for Puerto Rico, 39 STAT. 965 (1917), 48 U. S. C. A. § 863 (1926): judges appointed
for four years and serve until successor is appointed and qualified. The same sec-
tion provides for the appointment of a district attorney and marshal by the Presi-
dent, with the consent of the Senate, for a four year term "unless sooner removed
by the President." The provision for the removal of district attorneys and mar-
shals but none for the judge of the Court is of some weight in ascertaining whether
it was the intention of Congress to restrict the power of the President to remove
the judge.
6'Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926); Humphrey v. United States, 295
U. S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. ed. 908 (I935).
70District Court of Alaska, 31 STAT. 329 (x9oo), 48 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1926);
Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, D. C. CODE (1929) Tit. 18, § 252,
and Police Court of the District of Columbia, D. C. CODE, Tit. I8, § 151 (judges
appointed for six year term "subject to removal by the President, for cause");
formerly Justices of the Peace of the District of Columbia, Act of June 7, 1878,
c. 162, § I, 20 STAT. 100.
No restrictions of any kind are made as to the judges of the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands, supra note 68; district attorney and marshal of District
Court for Puerto Rico, supra note 681 judges, district attorney and marshal
District Court of the Panama Canal Zone, 42 STAT. 1005 (1922), as amended, 44
STAT. 924 and 47 STAT. 817, 48 U. S. C. A. § 1353 (1933) (appointed for four year
term "unless sooner removed by the President"); District Court of Hawaii, supra
note 68.
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An interesting question arises where the statute provides for the
appointment for a definite term of years but neither expressly gives the
removal power to the President nor places any other restrictions on
removal.7 1 Such a statute is open to two possible constructions: (i) the
officer or judge shall continue in office for the term specified subject to
removal by the President at will; or (2) during the term specified the
officer can be removed only by impeachment.
Where the officer performs executive functions it is reasonable to
interpret such a statute as giving to the President the power to remove
at will. 72 And where the officer's duties are executive as well as quasi-
judicial or quasi-legislative such interpretation is probably correct.
But where the functions of the office are not executive in nature, but are
judicial or quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative, it would seem more con-
sistent with the intention of Congress to interpret the statute as intend-
ing continuance in office for the term of years specified subject only to
removal by impeachment.
7"
In Marbury v. Madison,74 Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the
appointment of a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia for a
term of years prohibited the President from removing him during his
term. In United States v. Parsons7 5 it was held that a United States
7lDistrict Court of Puerto Rico, supra note 68 (four year term "until suc-
cessor is appointed and qualifies"). However, in the past there were a number
of such instances. McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 185-186 (1891).
As by future legislation Congress may enact similar statutes, a discussion of the
problem is pertinent.
72Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897) (district attorney); 4 Op.
Atty. Gen. 6o3, 61o (1847) (surgeon in navy); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. I (1842) (navy
officer).
73Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803); Cf. McAllister v. United
States, infra note 78. But see 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 288 (i851) (territorial judge
appointed for five years).
See also the dissenting opinion of Justice McLean in United States ex rel.
Goodrich v. Guthrie, 17 How. 284 (U. S. i855). A suit for a mandamus was
brought by a territorial judge against the Secretary of the Treasury to require
payment Qf his salary after his removal from office by the President. The judge
had been appointed for a term of four years, pursuant to a statute which stated
no grounds for removal. The Court dismissed the case on the ground that manda-
mus was not the proper remedy. Justice McLean in dissenting considered the
removability of such officer by the President. He stated at page 31o: "It is argued
that, as' the President is bound to see the laws faithfully executed, the power to
remove unfaithful or incompetent officers is necessary. This may be admitted to
be a legitimate argument, as commonly applied to executive officers..). But
however strongly this may refer to the political officers of the Government, how
can it apply to the judicial office?"
741 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803). See the discussion of this case, supra page 225.
75167 U. S. 324 (1897). See discussion of this case, supra note 35.
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district attorney, appointed to office for a term of four years, might be
removed at any time during his term and a successor appointed in his
stead, with the consent of the'Senate. The first case concerned an officer
performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions; the second, an execu-
tive officer. While it has'been suggested76 that the Parsons case over-
rules Marbury v. Madison, it is believed that the cases may be recon-
ciled on the ground that a different rule of construction applies to a
statute creating a quasi-judicial office than to a statute pertaining to an
office "purely executive" in character. 77 In view of the functional dis-
tinction between a district attorney and a justice of the peace, it is
doubtful whether the Parsons case could by mere implication overrule
Marbury v. Madison. It is believed that the rule announced in the
latter case is still sound law, and that consequently a territorial judge
holding office for a term of years may not be removed by the President
during his term in the absence of a statute conferring upon the Presi-
dent the right to remove.
7 8
C. Consular Courts.7 9 To carry out the provisions of treaties between
the United States and certain foreign countries Congress has estab-
lished consular courts within these countries.8 0 Ministers and consuls
of the United States when acting as consular courts have judicial
authority and functions. Such courts have jurisdiction in their respec-
76Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 143 (1926). See also part of dissenting
opinion of Justice McReynolds, id. at 216-221,226, disagreeing with the majority
as to Marbury v. Madison containing dictum or being overruled by the Parsons
case.
77See Humphrey v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 631, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 875, 79
L. ed. 9o8, 915 (1935), pointing out that Mr. Madison made a distinction between
judicial and executive officers. See also discussion of this point, supra page 226.
78 in McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 147 (I89I), the majority of the Court
held that territorial judges were not judges of the courts of the United States
and hence could be suspended pursuant to REv. STAT. § 1768 (1873). A successor
was appointed and confirmed while the judge was suspended. The opinion of the
Court specifically declares that its decision is in conformity with Marbury v.
Madison. The minority (Justices Field, Gray and Brown) dissented on the
ground that REV. STAT. § 1768 did not apply to territorial courts, and the judges
thereof appointed for a term of years could not be removed during their term.
The entire court, therefore, believed that the specification of a definite term of
years would prohibit the removal of territorial judges by the President.
"Consular courts now exist in China, Siam, Turkey, Morocco, Muscat, Egypt,
Persia, Ethiopia, Navigator Islands and the former Ottoman Empire. See
Department of State Appropriation Act of 1936, p. 6, Public No. 22, 74th Cong.,
i Sess., March 22, 1935.
8 0The consular courts in Japan, established by the Treaties of June 17, 1857
and July 29, 1858, were abolished by the Treaty of November 22, 1894, Art. 18,
29 STAT. 853. Because of conventions and treaties the United States no longer
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tive localities over all criminal offenses by citizens of the United States
and others.81
Congress has not placed limitations upon the removal of Ministers
and consuls by the President.8 2 It is doubtful whether under the Con-
stitution the Congress could do so. While Ministers and consuls have
judicial functions when acting as consular courts, the primary duties
of these officers are predominantly executive in nature. They act under
the direction of the Department of State. Their judicial duties may
properly be described as incidental. Such offices are to be distinguished
from the administrative officers performing important judicial or legis-
lative' functions. Consequently, any material limitation upon the power
of the President to remove Ministers and consuls would encroach upon
the executive power.
In the single instance of the United States Court for China, Con-
gress has endeavored to create an independent judicial consular court.
8 3
The judge of this court is appointed by the President with the consent
of the Senate for a term of ten years "unless sooner removed by the
President for cause."&' The limitation placed upon the removal of the
judge was not inadvertent since the statute also provides that the tenure
of other officers of the court "shall be at the pleasure of the President."
The functions of this Court are judicial and are unconnected with the
international or diplomatic affairs. It exercises jurisdiction formerly
conferred on the consular courts of China and appellate jurisdiction of
exercises jurisdiction through consular courts in Tripoli, Tunis, Samoan Islands
and Madagascar. See Historical Note to 22 U. S. C. A. § 141 (1926).
United States consuls also can exercise limited consular court jurisdiction in
uncivilized countries or countries not recognized by treaties. 12 STAT. 78 (1860),
22 U. S. C. A. § 180 (1926).
8120 STAT. 131 (1878), 12 STAT. 72 (1860), 22 U. S. C. A. § 142, 143 (1926).
When a consul is sitting alone the jurisdiction is limited. Id. § 15o, 151, 153.
Appeals to and original hearings by the minister are authorized. Id. § 165, 166.
82Consular clerks, however, are appointed by the President, and may be re-
moved "for cause ... submitted to Congress at the session first following such
removal." REV. STAT. § 1704, 1705 (1873). Under the principles of Myers v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), this restriction is probably unconstitutional.
8'34 STAT. 814 (1906), 22 U. S. C. .A. c. 3 (1926). The Court for China formerly
made its reports to the Secretary of State. By EXECUTIVE ORDER 6166, June IO,
1933, promulgated pursuant to 47 STAT. I517 (1933), providing for reorganization
of executive Agencies, the President transferred the United States Court for China,
together with the District Court for the Canal Zone and the District Court for the
Virgin Islands, to the Department of Justice. It is doubtful whether the United
States Court for China is an executive agency in spite of the attempt of the Presi-
dent to so classify it. Even if it is, the judge of the Court would certainly seem not
to be a "purely" executive officer. The principles of Humphrey v. United States,
supra note I, would prevent his removal at will by the President.
8434 STAT. 816 (1906), 22 U. S. C. A. § 199 (1926).
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small cases which consuls in China still decide. The judicial character
of the judge of this court is further illustrated by the fact that appeals
from the court lie to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.8 6
The functions of the judge of the court being judicial in nature, the
restriction that the judge may be removed for cause is a valid consti-
tutional limitation.
D. Board of Tax Appeals. 7 The sixteen members of the Board of
Tax Appeals are appointed by the President with the consent of the
Senate for terms of twelve years each "solely on ground of fitness to
perform the duties of the office." 88 They are removable "by the Presi-
dent, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other reason." 89
Congress has thus clearly manifested an intention definitely to restrict
the President's power to remove members of this Board.
The Board has jurisdiction to review de novo on petition by the
taxpayer proposed deficiencies of income, estate or gift taxes by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.90 While the Board of Tax Appeals
is technically not a court,91 its jurisdiction, powers and functions are
clearly judicial in character.
The Board of Tax Appeals statute raises the unusual question of the
effect upon the r~moval power of designating an administrative agency
as part of the executive branch of the Government. Part of the func-
8s34 STAT. 814 (1906), 22 U. S. C. A. § 191-193 (1926). In one aspect part of the
jurisdiction is administrative in that the court carries out certain provisions of
treaties with China.
$34 STAT. 815 (i906), 22 U. S. C. A. § 194 (1926).
8743 STAT. 336 (1924),44 SAT. io6, 26 U. S. C. A. c. 5 (B) (1935); Revenue Act
of 1924, § 9oo, amended by Revenue Act of 1926, § iooo.
88Revenue Act of 1926, § iooo, amending Revenue Act of 1924, § 9oo. This
section also provides for terms of the first members and contingencies as to length
of term where vacancies are filled.
$'§ 902 of the Revenue Act of 1924, as amended, provides that a member re-
moved in accordance with the statute shall not be permitted at any time to
practice before the Board. Because of this penalty it is believed that the courts
would be inclined to require an actual "public hearing" provided for by the statute
and rather strict proof that the member was in fact inefficient, neglectful of his
duty or misbehaved himself in office in a grievous manner.
90Revenue Act of 1924, § 9oo(e) and Sec. 904, as amended by Revenue Act of
1926, § iooo. Gift Tax Act of 1932, § 513, as amended by Revenue Act of 1934,
§ 5o. The Board also has jurisdiction to determine additional deficiency or over-
payments if they exist. For limitations on the Board's jurisdiction, see PAUL AND
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1935) c. 33, § 43.o, ef seg.
9101d Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 76 (1929).
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tions of the Board were formerly performed by the Committee on
Appeals and Review, a division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It
was felt by Congress that taxpayers would be better satisfied if pro-
posed deficiencies were reviewed by a board independent of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue. In view of this fact the statute creating
the Board of Tax Appeals states that it is an "independent agency in
the executive branch of the Government."
92
As discussed previously, when an administrative agency or board
exercises quasi-legislative or judicial functions Congress may limit the
removal power of the President.93 The fact that such an agency or
board is part of the executive branch of the Government does not pre-
vent Congress from placing reasonable limitations on the President's
power. The statutory designation of the Board of Tax Appeals as "an
independent agency in the executive branch of the Government," there-
fore, is not controlling. The test still is whether the duties and functions
of the office require that it be reasonably secure from the domination
of the executive. A consideration of the entire statute shows clearly
that Congress intended the Board of Tax Appeals to be an administra-
tive agency performing judicial functions independent of the other
officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and independent of the
control of the President. The removal restriction of the statute con-
sequently appears to be constitutional.
E. Comptroller General of the United States.94 The administrative
courts considered above perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
We now come to an office having solely quasi-legislative duties.
Before the establishment of the General Accounting Office the func-
tions of auditing and settling accounts were performed by the Comp-
troller of the Treasury.95 By the Act of June IO, 1921 the General
Accounting Office was established as "independent of the executive
departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller
9Revenue Actfof 1924, § 9oo(k) and § 900, as amended by Revenue Act of 1926,
§ iooo. The use of the word "independent" indicates Congress intended that the
Board was not to be subject to executive control, although it may be argued that
its use was merely to make the Board independent of the Commissioner. A similar
provision is in the statutes creating the National Mediation Board, infra note 119,
and the Railroad Retirement Board, infra note 107. Cf. also, National Bitumi-
nous Coal Commission, infra page 245.
93See discussion of this point supra page 223. Humphrey v. United States, 295
U. S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. ed. 9o8 (1935).
1442 STAT. 20 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1926).
9REv. STAT. § 271 (1873), as amended, REV. STAT. § 236 (1873). See 20 Op.
Atty. Gen. 677 (1893) for history of the office of auditor since 1789.
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General of the United States."' 6 The act created the offices of Comp-
troller General and Assistant Comptroller General of the United
States. These officers are appointed by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to hold office for fifteen years, and
" ... may be removed at any time by joint resolution of Con-
gress after notice and hearing, when, in the judgment of Congress
the Comptroller General or Assistant Comptroller General has
become permanently incapacitated or has been inefficient, or guilty
of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or
conduct involving moral turpitude, and for no other cause or in no
other manner except by impeachment."
97
In creating these offices Congress clearly intended to restrict definitely
the President's removal power. In fact, Congress proposed to keep the
removal power in itself, the President sharing in it only when he signs
a joint resolution of removal.98 A consideration of the nature of the
office and of the need of an independent auditor to check expenditures
and accounts of all Federal officers and agencies, should determine
whether Congress has acted both wisely and constitutionally in at-
tempting to retain in itself the sole power of removal.
The need of an auditor independent of the executive was recognized
from the beginning of our Government."9 The restraint which the
9'42 STAT. 23 (192), 31 U. S. C. A. § 4T (1926).
9742 STAT. 24 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. § 43 (1926). This section also provides that
either officer so removed is ineligible for reappointment, and upon reaching
seventy years of age shall be retired. The Comptroller General is not eligible for
reappointment.
98A Bill was introduced in President Wilson's last administration to establish
the General Accounting Office. It provided for the removal of the Comptroller
General by a concurrent resolution of Congress. Such resolutions are not signed
by the President. JEFFERSON'S MANUAL (1931) §§ 389, 390. 'President Wilson
vetoed this Bill because he thought this restriction on his removal power was
unconstitutional. VETO MESSAGE TO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 59 CONG.
REc. 86o9-861o (1920). See Powell, The President's Veto of the Budget Bill (1920)
9 NAT. MuNIc. REv. 538, for a criticism of this veto. The House overrode the
veto, but Congress adjourned before the Senate could act upon it.
Substantially the same Bill was introduced and passed in the succeeding
Congress and signed by President Harding on June io, 1921. The Act provides
that the removal of the Comptroller General must be by a joint resolution. Such
resolutions must be signed by the President to be effective. JEFFERSON'S MANUAL
(1931) §§ 389,390. Congress can override the President's veto. The effect of the Act,
therefore, is that the Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General
can be removed only by the joint efforts of both Congress and the President,
unless, of course, Congress overrides a presidential veto of the joint resolution.
99See i CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES (1789-90) col. 636, 638; I U. S. H. Docs.,
24th Cong., ist Sess., p. 399 (1835); Message of President Taft on Commission of
Economy and Efficiency, June 27, 1912, H. Doc. No. 854, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess.
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Comptroller General, by his accurate and efficient administration, has
placed on wasteful or unauthorized expenditures fully justifies the
creation of the office. It is also clear that his effectiveness is in part at
least due to his freedom from executive interference.
The functions of the Comptroller General are primarily to determine
whether disbursements are being or have been made in accordance with
law.100 No monies ordinarily can be expended without his approval
and signature.10 1 He is also authorized to make investigations at the
request of the President or Congress in regard to such disburse-
ments.
102
The power to raise revenue and to appropriate money is a legisla-
tive power. As an incident to this power Congress may pass such laws
as are necessary and proper to insure that disbursements of money
will be made in accordance with its legislative mandates. Congress has
determined that this cannot be done effectively if the duties of the office
of Comptroller General are performed by one under the control of the
branch of the Government which spends the money. It therefore has
provided that the auditor shall be responsible to Congress as its agent.
The functions of the office are quasi-legislative. The Comptroller
General acts as the agent of Congress. In the Humphrey case the Court
specifically stated that the Myers decision "affirming the power of the
President alone to make the removal, is confined to purely executive
officers."'01 3 Where, therefore, Congress has created an office whose
functions are in no way executive but are quasi-legislative, Congress
may retain the removal power or give to the President such a share in
the removal power as it sees fit. Under the principles of the Humphrey
10042 STAT. 20 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. C. 2 (1926).
10142"STAT. 24 (192), 31 U. S. C. A. § 76 (1926).
10242 STAT. 25 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. § 53 (1926). The duty to make investiga-
tions at the request of Congress is merely one of the minor purposes of the office.
Such a subordinate duty does not make the officer in any sense part of the execu-
tive branch of the Government. Cf. Humphrey v. United States, 295 U. S. 602,628
(I935), where the Court points out in a footnote to its opinion that a similar duty
in the Federal Trade Commission Act is so obviously collateral to the main design
of the Act as not to detract from the force of the statement that the Commission
is a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial body.
'03Humphrey v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 631-632, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 875
(935). It is interesting to note that Solicitor General Beck in his brief, page IOO,
in the Myers case argued that the Comptroller General could be removed at will
by the President in spite of the restrictions in the statute. Later, when no longer
Solicitor General, Mr. Beck candidly admits that upon further study of the func-
tions of the General Accounting Office, he reached the conclusion that the Comp-
troller General is an agent of the legislature, independent of the executive, and not
removable under the principle of the Myers decision. See BECK, OUR WONDER-
LAND OF BUREAUCRACY (1933) 188-igo.
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case the Comptroller General or Assistant Comptroller General seem
to be immune from executive removal.
F. Administrative Commissions, Boards and Agencies.1 0 4 As our
Government has grown the complexity of modern society has de-
manded that the Federal Government assume more and more govern-
mental activities. The result is that today there are innumerable Federal
agencies, boards, commissions and bureaus performing almost every
conceivable administrative function. The need of the administrative
expert is obvious in such a centralization of authority. The Humphrey
case states the fundamental basis of the authority of Congress to create
independent administrative agencies:
"The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their
duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted;
and that authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to
fix the period during which they shall continue, and to forbid their
removal except for cause in the meantime."'10 5
It may be said that most administrative agencies or experts perform
executive functions in carrying out the laws which the President has
the general duty to enforce.106 Either by provisions of statutes or by
1°4Lists of many of these agencies are set forth in the footnotes to this discussion.
The mushroom birth and occasional death of such agencies in recent years renders
it practically impossible to make a full or accurate list. Only those now existing
are herein discussed. See infra note io8. To attempt to analyze each administra-
tive agency to determine whether Congress intended it to be independent of the
executive branch of the Government, or to determine whether its functions are
executive, quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative, or a combination of two or more, is
beyond the scope of this article.
106Humphrey v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 869,874,79 L. ed.
9o8, 914 (1935).
110(A) As to the following agencies Congress has specifically stated that the
members may be removed at the pleasure of the President: Civil Service Com-
mission, 22 STAT. 403 (1883), 5 U. S. C. A. § 632 (1926) (no specific term of years
is stated); War Finance Corporation, 40 STAT. 507 (918), 15 U. S. C. A. § 333
(1926) (not appointed with advice of Senate; now dissolved); Commissioner of
Fisheries, 43 STAT. 1046 (1925), I6 U. S. C. A. § 741 (1926); Comptroller of the
Currency, x3 STAT. 99 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. § 2 (1926) (5 year term "unless sooner
removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the
Senate"); semble, Director of the Mint, i7 STAT. 424 (1873), 31 U. S. C. A. § 251
(1926); Tennessee Valley Authority Board, 48 STAT. 59, i6 U. S. C. A. § 831a
("shall have a term of office expiring nine years. . ."); United States Tariff Com-
mission, 46 STAT. 696, I9 U. S. C. A. § 1330 (i93o), but see infra note io8.
(B) As to the following agencies the statute merely prescribes a term of a speci-
fied number of years: Directors of Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 47 STAT.
5, i5 U. S. C. A. § 6o3 (932); formerly Federal Radio Commission, Act of Feb. 23,
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implication the members of most of these agencies are removable at
will by the President.10
Congress has endeavored in several instances definitely to create
commissions or boards, independent of executive control, having at
least in part quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions. 0 8 The prin-
1927, c. 169, 44 STAT. 1162; Federal Communications Commission, 48 STAT. io66,
47 U. S, C. A. § i54b (1934); Federal Power Commission, 46 STAT. 797, 16 U. S.
C. A. § 792 (1930); U. S. Shipping Board, 47 STAT. 4o8,46 U. S. C. A. § 804 (1932);
Federal Board of Vocational Education, 39 STAT. 932 (1917), 20 U. S. C. A. § 17
(1926); Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 47 STAT. 736, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1437
(1932); United States Employees' Compensation Commission, 38 STAT. 748
(i916), 5 U. S. C. A. § 778 (1926).
(C) As to the following agencies not even a term of office is specified: Adminis-
trator, of Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 48 STAT. 55, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 723a (I933); Director of National Bureau of Standards, 32 STAT. 829 (1903), 15
U. S. C. A. § 274 (1926); Office of National Archivist, 48 STAT. 1122,40 U. S. C. A.
§ 231 (I934); Central Statistical Board, Public No. 219, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
July 25, 1935; Commissioner of Education, 14 STAT. 434 (1867), 20 U. S. C. A., c.
i, § 2 (1926); Administrator of Veterans' Bureau, 43 STAkT. 6o8 (1924), 38 U. S. C.
A. § 425 (1926) (this Act also provides that the Veterans' Bureau "is established
as an independent Bureau under the President").
See also infra note 107.
107As to the following agencies the statute states only that the members "shall
hold their offices for a term of" a certain number of years: Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78d (1934); Social Security
Board, Public No. 273, § 701, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., August 14, 1935; Administra-
tor of Federal Housing Administration, 48 STAT. 1246, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1702
(I934); Railroad Retirement Board, Public No. 399, § 6 (a), 74th Cong., Ist
Sess., August 29, 1935 ("established as an independent agency in the executive
branch of the Government"); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, directors,
48 STAT. 969,- 12 U. S. C. A. § 264b (1934); formerly, the Federal Farm Board, 46
STAT. II, 12 U. S. C. A. § I I4Ia (1929). Possibly also Federal Farm Loan Board, 39
STAT. 36o (i916), 12 U. S. C. A. §654 (1926) (six year term "unless sooner re-
moved for cause by the President"). The duties of this board were probably
executive. By EXECUTIVE ORDER 6084, March 27, 1933, its duties were trans-
ferred to the Farm Credit Administration, an executive agency. It thereby be-
came obsolete.
As a matter of statutory construction, the phrase, "shall hold office" for a
certain term of years, as applied to this type of governmental agency would not
mean that the officer hold the office for the term specified subject only to removal
by impeachment. Possibly, however, if some of these commissions administer
their quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative duties independently of the President, as
does the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission,
it might be held that the phrase "shall hold office" is a valid restriction upon the
right of the President to remove.
' 08Federal Trade Commission, see Humphrey v. United States, supra note I;
Interstate Commerce Commission, infra page 243; National Mediation Board,
infra note I i9; National Labor Relations Board, infra page 244; Federal Reserve
Board, infra page 246; Board of Tax Appeals, supra page 237; National Bituminous
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ciples of the Humphrey and other cases previously discussed are perti-
nent in determining how far Congress has restricted the President's
removal power of members of such agencies, and whether such re-
strictions are valid constitutional limitations.
(i) Interstate Commerce Commission. The removal provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Commission Act are identical with those
contained in the Federal Trade Commission Act. 0 9 The principal func-
tions of the Interstate- Commerce Commission are dearly quasi-legisla-
tive and quasi-judicial in character.'1 0 While some of the functions of
the Interstate Commerce Commission seem to be executive in nature,
these functions are so obviously collateral and subordinate to the quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial functions of the Commission as to make
it clear that the Commission is not "purely executive" within the mean-
ing of the Humphrey case."'
Coal Commission, infra page 245; formerly the Board of General Appraisers,
supra note 58; formerly Railroad Labor Board, 41 STAT. 456, 470 (1920); formerly
the United States Coal Commission, 42 STAT. 1023 (1922), amended by 42 STAT.
1446 (1923); formerly United States Shipping Board, 39 STAT. 728, 729 (1916), 46
U. S. C. A. § 804 (1926) (six year term: "any commissioner may be removed by
the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office"). United
States Tariff Commission as it existed before the amendment of June 13, 1930
(46 STAT. 696, 19 U. S. C. A. § 1330), provided twelve year terms of office and
that "any member may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office." 39 STAT. 795 (1916), 19 U. S. C. A. § 91 (1926).
The duties of the office are to make investigations for Congress, its committees,
and the President. It is solely a fact finding body (34 Op. Atty. Gen. 77 (1924)),
and it acts mainly as an agent of Congress. As such an agent of Congress the
limitations on the President's removal power would be constitutional.
109Interstate Commerce Commissioners are appointed for seven year terms,
and they may be removed by the President "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office." 24 STAT. 383 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § i I (1926), amended by
Public No. 208, July 16, 1935, 74th Cong., Tst Sess.
11024 STAT. 382 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 12-16, 46-47 (1926).
"The principal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act were to secure just and
reasonable charges for transportation; to prohibit unjust discriminations in the
rendition of like services under similar circumstances and conditions; to prevent
undue or unreasonable preferences to persons, corporations or localities; to in-
hibit greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same
line; and to abolish combinations for the pooling of freights ... " Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 276 (1892).
inmm Humphrey v. United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, 628 (935), a footnote to the
opinion points out that the duty of the Federal Trade Commission to make in-
vestigations of alleged anti-trust violations is obviously collateral to the main
design of the Act and does not detract from the holding that its functions are
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. The administrative duties of the Interstate
Commerce Commission pertaining to carriers are comparable in their nature to
those of the Federal Trade Commission relating to unfair trade practices.
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As pointed out in discussing the Court of Claims above,11 2 the Su-
preme Court intended that its opinion in the Humphrey case should
be applicable to members of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Humphrey case is assurance to the members of that commission
that the Chief Executive can remove them only after notice and hearing
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
(2) National Labor Relations Board."3 The statute relating to the
removal of members of the National Labor Relations Board provides
that its members are appointed by the President, with the consent of
the Senate, for a term of three years. They "may be removed by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or
ineligibility, but for no other cause.""' 4 Are these restrictions on the
President's power of removal constitutional? Again we must look to
the nature and functions of the office for the answer.
The duties of the Board generally are to enforce collective bargain-
ing and to prevent any unfair labor practice affecting interstate com-
merce. 1 5 The Board after investigation and a hearing may issue an
order to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and to take
such affirmative action as will effectuate the policy of the National
Labor Relations Act." 6 Appeals from such orders of the Board to a
Circuit Court of Appeals are provided for."-
7
The functions as to labor practices and collective bargaining of the
Board are analagous to those provisions of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act which authorize the Commission to prevent methods of
unfair competition and to enforce the provisions of the Clayton Act.
Under the Humphrey case such activities are quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial in character." 8 The statutory restrictions on the Presi-
'1Supra page 231.
rl3Public Act No. I98, § 2, July 5, 1935, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. This board is
derived from the National Labor Relations Board established by Public Resolu-
tion No. 44 (Labor Disputes Act), 73rd Cong., ist Sess., which authorized such a
board to enforce Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
1141d. § 3.
16Id. §§ 7 and 8. This article does not pretend to discuss the constitutional
limitations placed upon the jurisdiction of the Board, or the constitutionality of
the Act creating the Board. Id. § Io.
nT!bid. If an order is not obeyed, the Board may petition a Circuit Court of
Appeals to review and enforce it. In like manner a party against whom an order is
issued may appeal. The findings of fact of the Board are conclusive if supported by
evidence.
UsSupra page 223 and note 27. See also Federal Trade Commission Act, 38
STAT. 79 (1914), as amended 43 STAT. 939, I5 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1926).
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dent's right to remove members of the National Labor Relations Board
are therefore very probably constitutional. 110
(3) National Bituminous Coal Commission. The National Bitumi-
nous Coal Commission is established pursuant to an Act to regulate
the bituminous coal industry.. 20 In general it applies to a single in-
dustry the broad principles which the National Industrial Recovery
Act attempted to apply to all industry affecting interstate commerce.
The five members of the commission are appointed by the President
with consent of the Senate for four year terms and are removable "by
the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in of-
fice." 121 The Act also provides that the Commission "is hereby estab-
lished in the Department of the Interior." However a study of the Act
does not reveal that the Secretary of Interior or his Department has
any supervision over the Commission.
The Commission has the duty to organize district boards, to formu-
late a code of fair competition for the bituminous coal industry, by
appeal or on its own initiative to review and modify orders and prices
119The National Mediation Board (48 STAT. 1I93,45 U. S.C. A. § 154 (1934)) is
also a new Board established to assist relations between industry and labor. Its
principal function is to "use its best efforts, by mediation" to bring carriers and
their employees to an agreement in labor disputes. 45 U. S. C. A. § 155. The Board
can interpret the agreement. If the Board cannot bring the conflicting interests to
arbitrate, no change in wages or labor conditions is supposed to take place for
thirty days. The Board can appoint arbitrators until an agreement is reached.
Id. § 155. A binding judgment is entered on an arbitration agreement. Id. § i59.
The Board makes reports to Congress. Id. § I54. While the functions of the Board
are difficult to classify, its major duties seem to be probably quasi-legislative.
Congress intended the Board to be independent. The statute relating to the
appointment and removal of members is worded like that establishing the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. However, it also is designated "as an independent
agency in the executive branch of the Government." 45 U. S. C. A. § 154. The
designation is not controlling. See discussion as to similar phrase in statute
creating Board of Tax Appeals, supra page 237.
Congress created this Mediation Board to establish an agency to assist ir
settling strikes. It believed such a board could operate more effectively if free
from executive control. Because the functions of the Board are merely to try to
assist in settling railroad disputes, it is difficult to determine whether Congress
has acted within its constitutional powers in placing restrictions on the President's
removal power. While Congress probably acted properly, if a test of the statute
should ever arise the decision may be influenced by the effectiveness of the Board
and whether it has conducted its functions independently of the Executive.
12OThe Commission is to be established pursuant to § 2(a) of the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935, commonly known as the Guffey Coal Bill. Public
No. 402, 74th Cong., ist Sess., August 30, 1935. The Act ceases in four years, id.
§ 21. The taxing provisions of § 3 became effective on November 1, 1935. Id. § 20.
21d. § 2(a). § 2 of the Senate Bill did not contain this limitation on removal.
S. 1417, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).
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promulgated by the local boards and generally to administer and en-
force the Act.1 22 The orders of the commission may be enforced and
reviewed by a Circuit lCourt of Appeals. 1 23 Unlike the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act the Code to be formulated does not require
approval by the President.
The functions of the Commission seem to be quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial in nature. While the duties are not so clearly non-execu-
tive as those of the Federal Trade Commission or the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Commission does not perform purely executive
functions. Although not free from doubt, it is believed that the rule of
the Humphrey case makes the limitations of the Act on the President's
power to remove the members of the Commission valid constitutional
restrictions. 124 Because of the doubtful constitutionality of parts of the
Act and the four year statutory existence for the Commission, it may
well be that a judicial test of the removal provisions of this Act will
never arise.
125
(4) Federal Reserve Board. The Banking Act of 1935,126 amending
the Federal Reserve Act, probably has assured the independence of the
governors of the Federal Reserve Board. The seven members of the
Board now have terms of fourteen years each "unless sooner removed
for cause by the President."'
127
The intent of Congress to make the Board independent of the execu-
tive and not subject to his influence is further shown by the recent
amendment that after February I, 1936 the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Comptroller of the Currency will no longer be members of the
Board.1
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InId. Part I, Part II and §§ 5(a), 6(b) and § x6-i8.
uId. § 6(b) (c) (d). Findings of fact supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive.
'1 The fact that the Commission is stated to be part of the Department of
Interior and that it is a minor reincarnation-of the defunct N. R. A., a purely
executive agency, are factors which may make inapplicable the principles of the
Humphrey case. I
inPart of the Act has been declared unconstitutional. Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., U. S. L. Week, Dec. 3, 1935, at 233 (D. C. Sup. Ct.), cert. granted Dec. 23,
1935. But other cases held the act constitutional. R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn,
U. S. L. Week, Nov. i9, 1935, at 193, 219 (D. C. Ky.), cert. granted Dec. 23, 1935.
nBPublic No. 305,74th Cong., ist Sess., August 23, 1935, amending Federal Re-
serve Act, 12 U. S. C. A. c. 3 (1926).
1271d. § 2o3(a), amending § io of the Federal Reserve Act. The amendments of
the Act of June x6, 1932, C. 89, § 6(a), provided that the governors "shall hold
office for a term of 12 years from expiration of the term of his predecessor". Before
that the Act read as it now does, 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 241, 242 (1926).
1281bid. The salaries and expenses of the Board are paid from funds collected by
assessments for these purposes on the member banks. 12 U. S. C. A. § 243 (1926).
PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER
The Federal Reserve Act and the Banking Act of 1935 contain the
legislative standards for the Board to follow in carrying out the banking
and monetary policies of Congress. 129 It is the function of the Board
to effectuate these policies within such limitations as the needs of banks
and finance vary from day to day. Such duties appear to be quasi-
legislative in nature. The complicated monetary-structure of our coun-
try makes it "necessary and proper" for Congress as an incident to its
banking, revenue and monetary powers to provide for a Board to carry
out its policies independent of possible domination by a President for
political purposes. In view of this need for independence, it is believed
that Congress can and has constitutionally limited the right of the
President to remove the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.130
III. CoNcLusIoN
It is thus seen that Congress may create Governmental agencies
independent of the President's control through the power of removal.
Congress does this in the exercise of the exclusive legislative power
granted to it and under the authority to make all laws necessary and
proper to carry out these powers. However, in creating such agencies,
Congress must legislate so as not to disturb the division of powers con-
templated by the Constitution.
In determining whether this division of powers has been disturbed
by legislation in creating new agencies of Government, it is essential to
consider the nature of these agencies. If their functions are purely
executive, members of such agencies must remain subject to the control
of the Chief Executive, and Congress cannot interfere with the exercise
of his functions by attempting to restrict the power of the President to
remove executive agents from office.
129The Federal Reserve Board exercises general supervision over Federal
Reserve Banks. 38 STAT. 262 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. § 248 (i) (1926). It must ap-
prove rediscount rates established by the directors of each Reserve Bank before
they are put into effect. Id. § 248 (b). It also defines the classes of loans which the
law, in general terms, provides Reserve Banks may make. Id. § 371. It passes on
salaries of officers and employees of Reserve Banks. Id. 248 (1). Also it may re-
quire one Reserve Bank to lend to another which is short of funds. 47 STAT. 160,
12 U. S. C. A. § 347 (1934). In general, through its guidance, the Board exercises
great influence over the credit, interest rates and financial structure of the country
in accordance with the principles enacted by Congress.
130Mr. 3. W. B. Smith, connected with the Federal Reserve Board, in an article
on The Banking Act of 1935 (1935) 21 A. B. A. 3. 61o, 6ii states that as the
Humphrey case was decided while hearings were taking place on the Banking Bill
of 1935, which changed the removal provisions of the prior Act, it is direct author-
ity for the constitutionality of the restrictions on the President's power to remove
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.
248 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
On the other hand, if the Congress appoints officers to act as its own
agents, or if it creates new administrative bodies whose chief functions
are judicial, quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative in nature, then the Con-
gress may restrict the removal power of the President and thereby
insure the independence of such officers and agencies. In so doing the
legislature does not infringe upon the executive power.
And even where the agencies perform substantial executive functions
as well as important duties of a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative na-
ture, there is authority to support the view that Congress may impose
reasonable restrictions on the removal power of the President.
The constitutional division of powers requires, on the one hand, that
Congress shall not interfere with the prerogative of the President to
control purely executive officers, and, on the other hand, that the Presi-
dent through the exercise of his removal power shall not interfere with
the lawful acts of Congress in creating administrative offices having
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.
